1. Estes Kefauver, Crime in America, Doubleday & Co., N.Y., 1951, pp. 139-40.
2. Ibid., p. 140.
3. Ibid., p. 138.
4. Robert F. Kennedy, The Enemy Within, Harper and Brothers, N.Y., 1960, pp. 215-38.
5. Ibid., p. 216.
6. Ibid., pp. 217-18.
7. Ibid., p. 218.
8. Ibid., p. 222.
9. Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology, The Free Press of Glencoe, N.Y., 1960, Chapter 7.
10. Ibid., p. 116.
11. Ibid., p. 117.
12. Ibid., pp. 117-18.
13. Ibid., p. 119.
14. Ibid., p. 128.
15. Ibid., pp. 128-29.
16. Ibid., pp. 130-33.
17. Ibid., pp. 134-35.
18. New York Times, February 17, 1965; 45:1.
19. Ferdinand Lundberg, Imperial Hearst, Equinox Press, N.Y., 1936, pp. 43, 103-4, 110-11, 133-36, 142, 153-64, 169-71, 291-301, 346. The newspaper-war story is followed in many of its subsequent strange ramifications on the basis of court proceedings to the highest levels in government through the tracing of the careers of two of its leading figures, the late Max and Moe Annenberg, in John T. Flynn, "Smart Money, Collier's, January 13, 20, 27 and February 3, 1940. This is a pure star-spangled American success story.
20. Kefauver, p. 86.
21. Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald R. Cressey, Principles of Criminology, J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, 1955, Chapter 3.
22. Edwin H. Sutherland, The Sutherland Papers, edited by Albert Cohen, Alfred Lindesmith and Karl Schuessler, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1956, p. 46.
23. As it was put by Willis J. Ballinger, economic adviser to the Federal Trade Commission, "For 48 years in this country we have been trying to deter economic murderers with 10-cent penalties for each mass killing."--Testimony on S. 10 and S. 3072 "Federal Licensing of Corporations" before a Subcommittee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, March 10, 1938.
24. Sutherland and Cressey, pp. 86-87.
25. Edwin H. Sutherland, White Collar Crime, with a foreword by Donald R. Cressey, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, N.Y., 1961 edition.
26. Ibid., p. 9.
27. Sutherland, The Sutherland Papers, p. 63. An extended discussion of this definition, cited by Sutherland, is in Jerome Hall, "Prolegomena to a Science of Criminal Law," University of Pennsylvania Law Review, LXXXIX, .1941, pp. 549-80; "Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts," Columbia Law Review, XLIII, 1943, pp. 735-79, 967-1001; "Criminal Attempts--a Study of the Foundations of Criminal Liability," Yale Law Review, XLIX, 1940, pp. 789-840.
28. Sutherland, The Sutherland Papers, p. 51
29. Sutherland and Cressey, pp. 40-41.
30. Sutherland, White Collar Crime, pp. 253-56.
31. Sutherland, The Sutherland Papers, p. 77.
32. Ibid., p. 66.
33. Ibid., p. 67.
34. Sutherland, White Collar Crime, p. 17 et seq.
35. The reader interested in identifications will have some difficulty reconstructing Sutherland's list even if he obtains the two original lists, taking sixty-eight top companies after excising public utilities (including transportation and communications), unless he deduces that the omitted industry is the oil industry. Later the reader will be referred to the Fortune lists of 500 corporations (published in July of each year) and of banks and utility companies (published in August of each year). These lists are made up from the same data scattered through Moody's and Poor's corporation reference manuals but are presented by Fortune in handy tabular form. None of these readily available lists is reproduced here, in order to conserve space for other material. Their availability to the reader is assumed.
36. Remuneration of top corporate executives--salaries plus stock bonuses and other perquisites--ranges between $100,000 and $750,000 per year. Drawing figures from United States Census of Population, 1950: Occupational Characteristics, Table 19, and the same publication for 1960, Table 25, we find that the median incomes in some strategic occupations are as follows:
1949 1959 1969* Natural scientists $4,245 $7,965 $15,000 Chemists 4,091 7,245 12,800 Social scientists 4,446 7,868 13,900 College faculty, deans and presidents 4,366 7,510 12,900 Teachers 3,465 5,709 9,400 Civil engineers 4,590 7,773 13,100 Electrical engineers 4,657 8,710 16,300 Mechanical engineers 4,594 8,497 15,700 Metallurgical engineers 4,657 8,639 16,100 Lawyers and judges 6,284 11,261 20,200 Actors 3,260 5,640 9,800
*The figures for 1969 are a provisional extrapolation of those for 1959, applying the inflationary rate of 1949-59 increase. They are taken from a compilation prepared by Professor A. T. Finegan for the Industrial Relations Section of Princeton University: Memorandum, May 21, 1964, "Income of Men in 48 Professional Occupations: 1949 and 1959." The entire table of all groups is reproduced in Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP Bulletin), June, 1965, p. 251.
37. Chic Conwell and Edwin H. Sutherland, The Professional Thief, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1937.
38. Sutherland and Cressey, pp. 38-47.
39. Sutherland's work on the concept of white collar crime and other aspects of crime has been accepted and incorporated into general works of criminology by leading criminologists and has stimulated much additional individual research and counter-criticism. It has been the most fruitful single concept in criminology in a long time. Some of the general works in which it is treated are: Harry Elmer Barnes and Negley K. Teeters, New Horizons in Criminology, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1959; Robert G. Caldwell, Criminology, Ronald Press, N.Y., 1956; Ruth S. Cavan, Criminology, Crowell, N.Y., 1955; Mabel A. Elliott, Crime and Modern Society, Harper and Bros., N.Y., 1952; Richard R. Korn and Lloyd W. McCorkle, Criminology and Penology, Holt-Dryden, N.Y., 1959; Walter C. Reckless, The Crime Problem, Appleton-Century-Crofts, N.Y., 1961; Donald R. Taft, Criminology, Macmillan, N.Y., 1956; and George B. Vold, Theoretical Criminology, Oxford University Press, N.Y., 1958. Some of the many monographs that have followed the trail blazed by Sutherland on white collar crime alone are Marshall B. Clinard, The Black Market: A Study of White Collar Crime, Rinehart, N.Y., 1952; Clinard, "Criminological Theories of Violations of Wartime Regulations," American Sociological Review, June, 1956; Clinard, "Sociologists and American Criminology," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, January-February, 1951; Frank E. Hartung, Law and Social Differentiation, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1949; Hartung, "White Collar Offenses in the Wholesale Meat Industry in Detroit," American Journal of Sociology, June, 1950; Hartung, "White Collar Crime: Its Significance for Theory and Practice," Federal Probation, June, 1953; Donald R. Cressey, Other People's Money, The Free Press of Glencoe, N.Y., 1953; Vilhelm Aubert, "White Collar Crime and Social Structure," American Journal of Sociology, November, 1952; Robert E. Lane, "Why Businessmen Violate the Law," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science, July-August, 1953. Two critics of Sutherland are effectively refuted by Cressey in the foreword to the 1961 edition of Sutherland's White Collar Crime.
But as Professor Walter Reckless of Ohio State University observes, "Most American sociologists have accepted the principal tenets of Sutherland's formulation with respect to white-collar crime." (Reckless, The Crime Problem, p. 225.)
No court has formally passed on the question: Is "white collar crime" crime?; it might be expensive, win or lose, to find out. As Cressey, now at the University of California, states in a footnote to his foreword to the 1961 edition of White Collar Crime: "The original White Collar Crime manuscript contained court and commission citations and, thus, identified the various corporations involved. The original publisher's attorneys advised Sutherland that a corporation might sue the publisher and author on the ground that calling its behavior criminal is libelous. Sutherland withdrew the manuscript and prepared the present one. Had the original manuscript (which Mrs. Myrtle Sutherland still holds) been published, and had a libel suit been initiated, then Sutherland's contention that the listed offenses are in fact crimes might have been tested in a court of law--a corporation might have argued that the statement is libelous because its behavior is not crime, with Sutherland giving the arguments in this volume. I was one of Sutherland's research assistants at the time, and I urged that the original manuscript be published for this reason, if for no other. However, my idealistic desire to see a scientific principle tested in a court of law was not tempered by any practical consideration such as having money riding on the legal validity of the scientific principle. This was not the case with either the publisher or Professor Sutherland.''
40. Communication from the Federal Trade Commission, dated September 8, 1965.
41. These figures were compiled from the annual reports of the Federal Security Agency, 1945-52, at pages 62, 63, 560, 570, 550, 228, 217 and 251 respectively (separate reports of the Food and Drug Administration for 1945, 19462 1951 and 1952 are cited, and from the annual reports of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1953-61, at pages 226, 220, 180, 222, 213, 214, 216, 260 and 354 respectively.
42. United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Twenty-six Annual Report, year ended June 30, 1960, p. 187.
44. National Labor Relations Board, Twenty-ninth Annual Report, 1964, p. 201.
45. Responding to inquiry about the number of findings against employers, the National Labor Relations Board in a letter dated September 1, 1965, says that such data are not available extending back to 1945 but are available beginning with 1953. "During the period July 1, 1953, through June 30, 1964 (11 years)," says the Board, "a total of 6,581 unfair labor practice cases were brought to the Board on contest over either the facts or application of the law. The Board found violations in 5,229 cases, or 79 per cent. Of the 6,581 contested ULP cases, 4,570 were 'CA' cases (charge against employer). The Board made findings of unfair labor practices against employers in 3,727 cases, or 82 per cent of the 4,570 contested 'CA' cases."
46. The preceding four paragraphs are a mild and sketchy version of the gangster-like way in which the late Henry Ford ran the Ford Motor Company. A more detailed presentation may be found in the solidly documented book by the University of Minnesota Ph.D., Keith Sward, titled The Legend of Henry Ford, Rinehart and Company Inc., N.Y., 1948, pp. 327-429. More extended sources are to be found in lengthy volumes of nine hearings before the National Labor Relations Board. The strong-arm men, the NLRB commented in the Dallas case, were those of "organized gangsterism." While this is all history now, I refer to the late Henry Ford as one example of a man who ran his company by methods of unbridled violence and underhanded subterfuge because there is perhaps more popular illusion about him as a benevolent industrialist than about any other. In reading about Ford it is difficult to see why there should be any particular worry about a Mafia infiltrating a big company other than concern that there might be new recruits to evil practices. The original Henry Ford, one is forced to conclude as one reads the record, had nothing to learn from any Mafia. He had, indeed, a close business association with Joe Adonis, since deported to Italy. Adonis, a notorious Mafia gangster, held the truck-hauling contract from Ford's Edgewater, New Jersey, plant and for this work from 1932 to 1940 was reputed to have received at least $3 million (Sward, pp. 299-300). Speaking of the Mafia....
47. These data are supplied in a memorandum accompanying a letter to the author from the United States Department of Justice, dated August 20, 1965. The writer states: "I am sorry I do not have the workload statistics available for public distribution as far back as 1945." The writer further states: "In answer to your second question the Division does not have readily available statistics showing a breakdown of monopoly and restraint of trade charges. You may obtain this information from several legal publications that publish resumes of antitrust cases as they are instituted and terminated. You will find activities in Government cases reported weekly in Trade Regulation Reports, published by Commerce Clearing House. Accounts of important antitrust cases and matters are also reported weekly in Antitrust & Trade Regulations Report published by the Bureau of National Affairs. I am sure you will find either of these publications helpful." I surely appreciate the Washington writer's desire to be helpful, but his remarks reflect the official statistical slackness that prevails with respect to corporate crimes.
48. John Herling, The Great Price Conspiracy, Robert B. Luce, Inc., Washington, D.C., 1962, p. 320.
49. Detailed treatment of the electrical-industry case is given in Herling's, The Great Price Conspiracy. John G. Fuller, The Gentlemen Conspirators, Grove Press, N.Y., 1962, may also be consulted. A more compressed account is in "The Incredible Electrical Conspiracy," Fortune, April-May, 1961. There is a subtle, balanced, ruefully gracious analysis of the ethical nuances of the case in Walter Goodman, All Honorable Men, "Business: A Way of Life," Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1963, pp. 9-99.
50. This case is reported in the New York Times, July 24, 1965; 1:8.
51. New York Times, July 27, 1965; 1:2.
52. Ibid., January 8, 1961; 63:1.
53. Ibid., October 24, 1966; 1:4; New York Post, May 15, 1967. The latter medium said that members of the Council were not only continuing to support the war despite escalation but were preparing to back Mr. Johnson for reelection in 1968 against any Republican yet named as a possible presidential contender. Mr. Johnson, in fact, commands more Big Business support than any president since William McKinley.
54. Allan Nevins, Study in Power: John D. Rockefeller, industrialist and Philanthropist, Charles Scribner's Sons, N.Y., 1953, Vol. II, p. 426. Reviewing this book in The Nation, May 30, 1953, Keith Hutchison observed that Nevins depicts Rockefeller "as a good man who committed many evil acts usually from the best of motives and with generally healthy consequences. This paradox leads to some strange conclusions."
55. New York Times, September 20, 1953; 67:1.
56. This subject is extensively treated in ASF, pp. 133-48, 186-202 and passim.
57. Sutherland, The Sutherland Papers, pp. 92-93.